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A B S T R A C T
Stimuli may induce only partial consciousness—an intermediate between null and full con-
sciousness—where the presence but not identity of an object can be reported. The differences in
the neuronal basis of full and partial consciousness are poorly understood. We investigated if
evoked and oscillatory activity could dissociate full from partial conscious perception. We re-
corded human cortical activity with magnetoencephalography (MEG) during a visual perception
task in which stimulus could be either partially or fully perceived. Partial consciousness was
associated with an early increase in evoked activity and theta/low-alpha-band oscillations while
full consciousness was also associated with late evoked activity and beta-band oscillations. Full
from partial consciousness was dissociated by stronger evoked activity and late increase in theta
oscillations that were localized to higher-order visual regions and posterior parietal and pre-
frontal cortices. Our results reveal both evoked activity and theta oscillations dissociate partial
and full consciousness.
1. Introduction
Conscious perception has been suggested to be an all-or-none process, where one can only be either fully aware or completely
unaware of a stimulus’ contents (Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005; Sekar, Findley, Poeppel, & Llinas, 2013; Sergent & Dehaene,
2004a) or a graded phenomenon, where one’s perception of a stimulus can be incomplete and imperfect (Elliott, Baird, & Giesbrecht,
2016; Kouider, De Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010; Nieuwenhuis & de Kleijn, 2011; Overgaard, Rote, Mouridsen, & Ramsøy, 2006;
Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010). A large part of the literature on visual perception has concentrated on
unraveling the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) by elucidating the differences in neural activity for seen and unseen stimuli
presented at perceptual threshold using electrophysiological recordings that reveal neuronal activity with millisecond precision.
These studies using non-invasive electroencephalography (EEG) (Sergent, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2005; Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme,
2007; Koivisto et al., 2008; Eklund & Wiens, 2018), magnetoencephalography (MEG) (Jones, Pritchett, Stufflebeam, Hamalainen, &
Moore, 2007; Melloni, Schwiedrzik, Muller, Rodriguez, & Singer, 2011; Palva, Linkenkaer-Hansen, Naatanen, & Palva, 2005) as well
as intracranial EEG (iEEG) (Fisch et al., 2009; Gaillard et al., 2009) recordings have shown that the strength of event-related activity
is positively correlated with conscious sensory perception. The amplitudes of local gamma (30–120 Hz) oscillations, both in MEG
sensor-level analyses (Palva, Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2005; Wyart & Tallon-Baudry, 2008) and iEEG (Aru et al., 2012; Fisch et al.,
2009; Gaillard et al., 2009; Vidal et al., 2014; Vidal, Perrone-Bertolotti, Kahane, & Lachaux, 2015), have also been shown to correlate
with conscious perception of visual stimuli.
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Only few studies have, however, investigated how neuronal activity is modulated by the degree of awareness achieved and the
neural mechanisms responsible for putative graded perception are debated (Christensen, Ramsøy, Lund, Madsen, & Rowe, 2006;
Tagliabue, Mazzi, Bagattini, & Savazzi, 2016). One model proposes that consciousness is composed of two distinct processes: phe-
nomenal consciousness—the perception of the actual content, and access consciousness—the ability to report, use or act upon the
percept (Block, 2005). The alternative partial awareness hypothesis (Kouider et al., 2010) posits that visual information is processed
through a hierarchy of representations and that levels of awareness depend on which representational levels can be accessed. In line
with this hypothesis, when participants rate the subjective visibility of simple geometric figures presented for different durations
using the four level Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004), the resulting psychometric functions display a
shallow slope, consistent with a gradual transition between no awareness and full awareness (Overgaard et al., 2006; Sandberg et al.,
2010; Sandberg, Bibby, Timmermans, Cleeremans, & Overgaard, 2011). In fMRI data, gradual increases in visibility are linked to
gradual increases in activity in fronto-parietal areas such as the intra-parietal sulcus (IPS), the precentral gyrus and the insula
(Christensen et al., 2006). FMRI evidence also suggest that visibility of low-level visual stimuli is reflected in cortical activity in both
lower and higher order visual cortex (Imamoglu, Heinzle, Imfeld, & Haynes, 2014). In EEG data, the visual awareness negativity
(VAN) has been associated with detection of visual stimuli (detection without identification) but not with discrimination of visual
stimuli (discrimination with correct identification) (Koivisto, Grassini, Salminen-Vaparanta, & Revonsuo, 2017). Furthermore, al-
though the strength of local gamma oscillations is correlated with awareness, in iEEG recordings the mere presence of gamma
oscillations signals the content of visual information but is not sufficient for conscious perception (Aru et al., 2012; Vidal et al., 2014).
This supports the idea of different neuronal underpinnings for full and partial consciousness.
We hypothesized that the neuronal underpinnings for full and partial consciousness would be reflected in the strength of evoked
responses and especially in the strength of induced oscillatory activity. To investigate the neuronal correlates of partial and full
consciousness, we recorded human cortical activity with MEG during a threshold detection task in which participants detected either
only the presence but not the identity of visual stimuli or both the presence and identity of visual stimuli. Different perceptual
outcomes for physically similar stimuli can be achieved by using masks (Del Cul, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2007), varying stimulus intensity
(Wyart & Tallon-Baudry, 2008) or using visual stimuli at individually determined perceptual threshold levels. In this study, we used a
combination of the latter two methods by asking participants to discriminate between two geometric shapes embedded in dynamic
noise at two independent and individually titrated thresholds for partial and full consciousness. Participants first made their per-
ceptual decision and then rated stimulus visibility using a four level PAS scale (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). We then compared the
evoked and oscillatory activity in source-localized MEG data between visual stimuli that were fully perceived, partially perceived or
not perceived to identify the distinct neuronal correlates of partial and full consciousness.
2. Material and methods
We used a data-driven analyses approach that reveals only the most robust effects in the data, regardless of whether they were or
were not the original hypothesis and as such provides a more rigorous testing for the hypothesis. The analyses were performed on a
well-validated and established data-driven analysis workflow used in several prior publications by the research group (Hirvonen &
Palva, 2016; Honkanen, Rouhinen, Wang, Palva, & Palva, 2015; Kulashekhar, Pekkola, Palva, & Palva, 2016; Palva, 2005; Palva,
Kulashekhar, Hamalainen, & Palva, 2011; Rouhinen, Panula, Palva, & Palva, 2013). All data analyses, where not indicated otherwise,
were performed on a LabVIEW-based (National Instruments) in-house developed neuroinformatics platform. The usage of the
platform is available upon request. The python code used to perform the cluster-based permutation analysis of the evoked MEG data
can be found on GitHub (https://github.com/palvalab/visual-perception). The task and MEG recordings of the data analyzed here are
described in detail in Lobier, Palva, and Palva (2017).
2.1. Participants and data acquisition
Magnetoencephalography (MEG) data were recorded from fourteen healthy participants (mean: 26.4 years old, range: 20–33;
seven females) with normal or corrected to normal vision using a 306 channel MEG instrument composed of 204 planar gradiometers
and 102 magnetometers (Elekta Neuromag, Helsinki, Finland) at 600 Hz sampling rate. Source reconstruction was unsuccessful for
one participant who was therefore excluded from all data analysis. T1-weighted anatomical MRI scans for cortical surface re-
construction models were obtained for each subject at a resolution of 1 × 1 × 1 mm (MP-RAGE) with a 1.5-T MRI scanner (Siemens,
Germany). The study was performed according to the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by an ethical committee of the Helsinki
University Central Hospital. Participants gave written informed consent on participation before the experiment.
2.2. Task and stimuli
We used MATLAB and Psychtoolbox-3 (Brainard, 1997) to generate the stimuli and task. Participants carried out a stimulus
discrimination task between two possible visual shapes (Fig. 1A). First, participants fixated on a red fixation cross (1° of visual angle)
centered in a circular patch of dynamic grayscale Perlin noise (diameter = 10°). After a jittered duration of 1.25 ± 0.25 s, the color
of the left or right half of the fixation cross changed from red to green, cuing participants to attend to either the left or right hemifield.
One of two geometrical shapes (at 2°) was displayed for 0.1 s in the attended or non-attended lower quadrant 1.25 ± 0.25 s after cue
onset. Trials could be valid (73%, stimulus displayed in the attended hemifield), invalid (18%, stimulus displayed in the non-attended
hemifield) or catch (9%, no stimulus displayed). Participants were asked to respond to both valid and invalid trials. Catch trials were
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used to calculate the false-alarm rate and ensure that participants were complying with task instructions (i.e., correctly withholding
response when no stimulus was present). Stimulus hemifield, contrast strength and trial type were pseudorandomized across trials
and participants. Participants were asked to indicate as accurately and quickly as possible which shape they had perceived by a
thumb lift and asked not to respond if they had not perceived any stimulus. Thumb and finger lifts were recorded via hand-held fiber
optic response pads. The shape assigned to each thumb was counterbalanced across participants. 2.15 ± 0.25 s after stimulus onset,
the color of the fixation cross changed to blue and participants were asked to rate stimulus visibility on a four level scale (not visible,
barely visible, partially visible, and fully visible) using finger lifts. During the experiment, participants were instructed to maintain
fixation on the fixation cross during the entire trial and eye movements were monitored using electrooculography (EOG).
To investigate partial and full consciousness, stimuli were displayed at two different contrast strengths. Contrast strengths were
calibrated individually at the beginning of the first recording session using the Palamedes toolbox implementation of the QUEST
algorithm. Participants took part in a one hour training session 24 to 48 h before the first recording session to ensure that they were
familiar and comfortable with the task and that perceptual learning effects did not affect contrast strength calibration. Low contrast
stimuli were calibrated to a 50% detection rate (participant perceived/detected a shape, irrespective of which one—partial con-
sciousness) and High contrast stimuli were calibrated to a 77% correct discrimination rate (participant perceived/discriminated the
Fig. 1. Behavioral results indicate that low contrast detection reflects partial consciousness while high contrast discrimination reflects full con-
sciousness. (A) Schematics of the experimental paradigm. Participants were cued to attend to the right or left hemifield by a change from red to
green of the relevant half of a central fixation cross. The attention cue remained on screen for the entire duration of the trial. After 1.25 ± 0.25 s,
one of two geometrical shapes was displayed for 0.1 s in the attended or non-attended lower hemifield at either low or high contrast. Participants
were asked to discriminate between these two geometrical shapes regardless of the stimulus location. After the central fixation cross changed to
blue, participants were asked to rate stimulus visibility on a four-level scale (not visible, barely visible, partially visible, fully visible). (B)
Performance of a representative participant during the thresholding procedure. Each data point represents the contrast strength of a trial, drawn in
trial chronological order from left to right. For data points from the 50% detection staircase, Hits represent seen stimuli and Misses unseen stimuli.
For data points from the 77% discrimination staircase, Hits represent correctly identified trials and Misses represent incorrectly identified trials. (C)
Distribution of contrast strengths for the Low and High contrast conditions. Dashed lines indicate change in contrast strength for each participant
between the two contrast conditions. (D) Individual Detection Hit-Rates (HR) for low and high contrast stimuli. (E) Individual Discrimination Hit-
Rates (HR) for low and high contrast stimuli. (F) Individual average Reaction Times (RT) for low and high contrast stimuli. (G) Individual false-
alarm rates for all subjects. (H) Individual sensitivity (d′) for low and high contrast stimuli. Sensitivity (d′) measures the distance between the means
of the signal and noise distributions. I. Individual response bias (β) for low and high contrast stimuli. Larger β values indicate a tendency to report
stimuli as undetected. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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correct shape—full consciousness). In both cases only attended trials were used for calibration purposes. For the MEG experiment,
high and low-contrast stimuli were presented in random order in sets of 88 trials, each set lasting 12 min. Each participant parti-
cipated in four recording sessions, each held on a different day, resulting in a total of 20–25 sets of 88 trials. The average number of
trials collected per participant, including all conditions and before artifact rejection, was 2120 (range 1584–2220).
2.3. Analysis of behavioral data
We computed reactions times (RTs), detection hit-rates (DET-HR) and discrimination hit-rates (DISC-HR) for each contrast
strength for Low contrast (partial consciousness) and High contrast (full consciousness) and stimulus hemifield (Left and Right) using
attended trials only. DET-HR was computed as the proportion of detected stimuli, regardless of discrimination accuracy. DISC-HR was
computed as the proportion of detected stimuli that were correctly discriminated. For stimulus detection, we computed measures of
signal detection theory: false alarm rate, d prime and beta (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). We reported Bayes factors –BF01- (Rouder,
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) expressing the probability of the data given H0 (absence of an effect) relative to H1
(presence of an effect). BF01 values larger than 1 are therefore in favor of H0. Bayes factors were computed using the R package
BayesFactor. For the Bayes factor analysis, an uninformative Jeffreys prior was placed on the variance of the normal population,
while a Cauchy prior with scale parameter of r = √2/2 was placed on the standardized effect size. By using Bayes factor analysis, we
tested whether DISC-HR and DET-HR were different from chance level for low contrast stimuli. We then compared performance
between right and left hemifields for other conditions. To test whether discrimination performance was different between high and
low contrasts, we used a repeated-measure 2 × 2 ANOVA with hemifield and contrast as within-subject factors. Hit-rates were
transformed with the arcsine square root before statistical analysis to stabilize variances, normalize proportional data and meet the
assumptions of ANOVA (Sokal & Rohlf, 1995).
2.4. MEG data preprocessing, and collapsing data into trials
We applied the temporal extension of signal space separation methods (tSSS) (Taulu, Simola, & Kajola, 2005) with MaxFilter
(Elekta Neuromag) to the raw signal to suppress extra-cranial noise, interpolate bad channels and co-localize recordings in signal
space individually for each participant. Using independent component analysis (ICA, MATLAB toolbox Fieldtrip, http://fieldtrip.
fcdonders.nl, (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011)), we extracted and identified components that were correlated with
ocular artefacts (identified using the EOG signal) or heart-beat artefacts (identified using the magnetometer signal as a reference).
The pre-processed MEG sensor time-series were epoched into individual trials of 1800 ms, spanning from−800 ms pre-stimulus onset
to 1000 ms post-stimulus. We rejected all trials that were contaminated by eye movements or muscle activity. These epoched trials
were subsequently used when computing the evoked response (Section 2.6) and oscillation amplitudes (Section 2.7).
2.5. MEG source reconstruction and creation of surface parcellations
We used Freesurfer software (Fischl, 2012) to carry out volumetric segmentation of the MRI data, surface reconstruction, flat-
tening, and cortical parcellation/labeling with the Freesurfer/Destrieux atlas (Destrieux, Fischl, Dale, & Halgren, 2010). We then used
MNE software (http://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/martinos/userInfo/data/sofMNE.php) (Gramfort et al., 2014) to create single-
layer boundary element conductivity models and cortically constrained source models for the MEG-MRI co-localization and for the
preparation of the forward and inverse operators (Dale et al., 2000). Source model dipoles were of fixed orientation (normal to the
pial surface) and located on a 5 mm resolution grid. Individual source models thus contained 11,000–14,000 source vertices.
The preprocessed MEG time-series was epoched from 500 ms to 1000 ms from visibility cue onset of all trials and broadband
filtered using a finite impulse response (FIR) from 1 to 45 Hz, to compute noise covariance matrices (NCMs). We used minimum-norm
estimate (MNE) in the form of dynamic statistical parametric map (dSPM) operators (Dale et al., 2000) that were built from the NCMs
and used 0.05 as the regularization constant. Individual broadband inverse operators were then computed from these NCMs using
MNE software and used to project the sensor-space data into source-space. These source-space vertices were then collapsed into 400
cortical parcels. The parcels were constructed by iteratively splitting the largest parcel of individual Destrieux parcellations (148
parcels) (Destrieux et al., 2010) along a previously determined axis. Axes were determined pre-emptively using the fsaverage brain in
Freesurfer. For each to-be-split parcel, the splitting axis was defined as the first principal component of the parcel. Splitting was
carried out until 400 parcels were defined. By using parcels and neuro-anatomical labels, we eliminate the need for inter-subject
morphing for group-level analyses (Hirvonen & Palva, 2016; Honkanen et al., 2015; Palva et al., 2011). Collapsing was carried out
using sparse fidelity-optimized collapse operators that maximized the reconstruction accuracy in each subject’s individual source
space (Korhonen, Palva, & Palva, 2014). The analyses were carried out in the 400 cortical parcels to allow maximal individual
functional cortical separability and robust optimization of the source-collapsing approach.
2.6. Evoked broadband activity analysis
For estimating the evoked response (ER), for each parcel, we used the epoched MEG time-series which was 1–45 Hz broad-band
filtered and decimated to 300 Hz (as in (Hirvonen & Palva, 2016)). We then computed from the parcel-collapsed broad-band filtered
time-series, the individual trial-averaged evoked response by applying a moving average of 5 samples. We computed ERs separately
for each condition but using only trials in which the stimulus was presented in the attended hemifield to avoid confounding effects of
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visuospatial attention. We first excluded trials with eye blinks in the peri-stimulus interval or eye movements in the post-stimulus
interval and next equalized the number of trials within condition pairs individually for each participant by removing trials from the
condition with greater number of trials, until both conditions had the same number of trials. This was done by comparing the onset
latencies of trials in both conditions, and removing trials with the largest difference between the latencies.
Before statistical testing, time-series were baseline corrected by subtracting the average pre-stimulus activity (−500 to −100 ms)
and collapsed into a coarser parcellation of 200 parcels to limit the number of comparisons and to improve statistical stability by
averaging out anatomical variability that is large across individuals (Hirvonen & Palva, 2016; Honkanen et al., 2015; Palva et al.,
2011). Group-level statistics were performed on the resulting time-series separately for each contrast and parcel using a cluster-based
random permutation approach (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007) performed in MNE-python (https://mne.tools/stable/index.html) such
that within a given parcel, a paired t-test was performed at each time-point, but not across anatomy. All contiguous time-points
exceeding a significance level of α = 0.01 were grouped into clusters. The cluster-level statistic of each cluster were then defined as
the sum of the t-values within the cluster. This approach controls the type-1 error rate in the presence of multiple comparisons across
time-points. We then created a null distribution of the cluster-level statistics using permutations. We randomly assigned the con-
ditions in subjects 1000 times, each time computing the largest cluster-level statistic for the permutation. We then used this null
distribution to classify clusters falling in the highest or lowest 0.5th percentile as significant. The cluster-based permutation analyses
were used to group effects by time and clusters deemed significant in the time-series of a parcel were independent of the time-series of
adjacent parcels. Lastly, to summarize our data and results in an unbiased manner, we adopted and modified a measure of connection
density (K) from network neuroscience (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009) and computed the fraction of cortical parcels that showed a
significant amplitude increase (cf. with K used to represent fraction of connections).
2.7. Estimation of induced oscillatory amplitudes
To investigate whether full and/or partial conscious perception were associated with a modulation of local oscillation amplitudes,
we filtered the epochs into 31 logarithmically spaced frequencies between 3 and 120 Hz using Morlet wavelets with a time–frequency
compromise parameter of m= 5. The Morlet filtered signals were then decimated to a frequency-dependent sampling rate (5 samples
per cycle/sampling frequency = 5 × filtering frequency). We computed induced oscillation amplitudes for each Morlet-wavelet
frequency by averaging amplitudes across all trials (N) and (T) and overlapping 100 ms time-windows with a 50 ms overlap such that
= ×A N T A P n t1 ( , , )P n t,
where Ap is the amplitude within a parcel, N is the number of trials and T is the number of time-windows (Hirvonen & Palva, 2016;
Honkanen et al., 2015; Palva et al., 2011). Averaged amplitudes were computed separately for each parcel and conditions.
2.8. Statistical analysis and visualization
Before statistical testing, amplitude data were baseline corrected by computing the logarithm of the baseline corrected amplitude:= ( )A logPcorr AA10 PP baseline, . Data were then collapsed to a coarser parcellation of 200 parcels to reduce the family-wise error by limiting
the number of comparisons and to improve statistical stability due variability in brain functional anatomy, that is large across
individuals (Hirvonen & Palva, 2016; Honkanen et al., 2015; Palva et al., 2011). Group statistics were subsequently performed
separately for each frequency and time-window. Significant differences in parcel oscillation amplitudes were estimated using a
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test with α = 0.05. To remove false positives (FP) caused by multiple statistical tests, we pooled all significant
observations over all parcels and then discarded as many of the least-significant comparisons as would predicted to be false dis-
coveries by the alpha-level used in the corresponding test under the null-hypothesis. In addition to this false discovery rate (FDR)
correction, for any given parcel, we only considered as significant time-frequency bins that were statistically significant in three
consecutive overlapping time-windows (i.e., 200 ms) as true neuronal activity was not expected to be as transient. This approach
hence removed further FPs from the data.
To summarize our results, we first computed the fraction of significant parcels (P+) as a function of time, similarly to that for the
evoked responses. To further remove the remaining FP findings from these summary data, we resampled the data using the leave-one-
out jackknife method (Rodgers, 1999) to estimate the variability of the data. The leave-one-out jackknife approach is suitable for
confirming the stability of observations and ensure that they are not driven by FPs, as demonstrated previously in Siebenhühner et al.
(2016). To this end, we computed the fraction of significant parcels (P+) at each time-point for each jackknifed sample. The change
of P+ across time for the full and jackknifed data was visualized together with the fraction of significant parcels to give confidence
limits to these data.
We visualized amplitude modulations across frequencies using amplitude time-frequency representations (TFRs) for each con-
trast. For each TF bin, we computed the fraction of cortical parcels that showed a significant amplitude increase (i.e., P+, the fraction
of significant positive parcels for each TF bin) or decrease (i.e., P−, the fraction of significant negative parcels for each TF bin). We
localized the amplitude response for time-frequency windows showing responses of interest.
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2.9. Visualization of neuronal activity in brain anatomy
Finally, we visualized the time windows for evoked activity and time-frequency windows for oscillatory activity of interest. Data
was averaged over the selected regions of interest and the parcels with the significant effects were visualized on an inflated cortical
surface. The color of the significant parcels reflected the average strength of the ER or amplitudes over the selected time window. To
support the interpretation of the results in terms of the functional subdivisions of the cortical surface, prior fMRI studies (Kravitz,
Saleem, Baker, Ungerleider, & Mishkin, 2013; Moradi et al., 2003) were used to link between the structural and functional anatomy.
Tentative boundaries of the primary visual cortex (V1) was mapped to occipital pole and calcarine sulcus, and extrastriate visual
cortex (V2) to the lingual gyrus and cuneus. The frontal eye fields (FEF) were mapped to the superior precentral sulcus. To identify
brain regions putatively supporting attentional or executive control functions, we used the boundaries of dorsal attention and fronto-
parietal networks defined by fMRI intrinsic connectivity patterns (Yeo et al., 2011).
3. Results
3.1. Behavioral results
Stimulus contrast strength was calibrated using two separate but interleaved Bayesian staircases to achieve 50% detection for low
contrast stimuli and 77% discrimination for high contrast stimuli. In all participants, Bayesian staircases converged towards distinct
contrast threshold values (see Fig. 1B for the thresholding data from a representative participant). At the group level (Fig. 1C), high
contrast strength (mean = 0.13, bias-corrected and accelerated [Bca] 95%CI = [0.11–0.15]) was significantly greater than low
contrast strength (mean = 0.023, Bca 95%CI = [0.022–0.025]) (t(12) = 9.29, p = 7.9·10−7, paired one-sample t-test).
We computed for each contrast strength (High and Low) and stimulus hemifield (Left and Right) three behavioral measures:
proportion of detected stimuli (DET-HR) (Fig. 1D), proportion of correctly discriminated stimuli (DISC-HR) (Fig. 1E) and reaction
times (RTs) (Fig. 1F), for attended trials only. Low contrast stimuli were calibrated to a 50% detection rate and this was reflected in
the mean ± SD of DET-HR, which was 0.51 ± 0.21 for stimuli in the left hemifield and 0.523 ± 0.173 for stimuli in the right
hemifield. DISC-HR for low contrast was at chance level for all subjects (Left: 0.504 ± 0.031, Right: 0.508 ± 0.039) which
indicates that participants were able to detect but not discriminate the low-contrast stimuli. Bayes Factor analysis showed that
discrimination performance was at chance level for low contrast stimuli regardless of hemifield (Left, BF01 = 3.4; Right,
BF01 = 4.5). These stimuli can thus be considered to be partially but not fully consciously perceived, consistent with prior studies of
partial conscious perception (Christensen et al., 2006; Imamoglu et al., 2014). For high contrast stimuli, DET-HR was at ceiling (Left:
0.978 ± 0.035, Right: 0.975 ± 0.037) while the DISC-HR matched the 77% discrimination rate targeted during calibration (Left:
0.735 ± 0.062, Right: 0.728 ± 0.083). High contrast stimuli were therefore fully perceived.
The false alarm rate was very low (0.035 ± 0.024), which indicates that the participants were able to avoid providing a response
during catch trials where no stimulus was displayed (Fig. 1G). Sensitivity, or d′ (d-prime), measures the distance between the means
of the signal and noise distributions. d′ for detection of low contrast stimuli was 1.96 ± 0.54 and for high contrast stimuli was
4.19 ± 0.55 (Fig. 1H). The d′ for high contrast was significantly larger than for low contrast (t(13) = 12.47, p = 3.14·10−8 ,
repeated-measures t-test), and indicates that participants were able to better distinguish between stimuli and catch trials when stimuli
were presented at the high contrast than in the low contrast.
Beta (β), a measure of response bias, reflects the minimum level of internal certainty needed to decide that a stimulus was present,
with larger values indicating a tendency to report stimuli as undetected. β was greater for low contrast (7.65 ± 6.31) than for high
contrast stimuli (1.41 ± 2.43) (t(13) = 4.57, p = 6.41·10−4 , repeated-measures t-test) (Fig. 1I). The participants were more likely
to report high contrast stimuli as detected, than low contrast stimuli.
We used Bayes Factor analysis to determine whether performance was consistent between hemifields. For low contrast stimuli,
DET-HR and DISC-HR did not differ between left and right hemifield stimuli (DET-HR: BF01 = 3.9; DISC-HR: BF01 = 3.5). For high
contrast stimuli, DET-HR and DISC-HR also did not differ between left and right hemifield stimuli (DET-HR: BF01 = 3.0; DISC-HR:
BF01 = 4.3). Reaction-times were similar for right and left hemifield stimuli for both contrast strengths (Low contrast, BF01 = 4.3;
High contrast, BF01 = 2.8). These data indicate that participant performance was similar in both hemifields. Since behavioral
performance did not differ between hemifields, we combined MEG data of right and left hemifield stimuli trials for subsequent
analyses of brain activity.
Lastly, we investigated whether performance was consistent with partial consciousness for low contrast stimuli and full con-
sciousness for high contrast stimuli. Bayes Factor analysis showed that discrimination performance differed for low and high contrast
stimuli, regardless of hemifield (Left, BF01 = 3.5·10−6; Right, BF01 = 4.6·10−6). We also tested whether discrimination perfor-
mance was different between high and low contrasts using a repeated-measure 2 × 2 ANOVA with hemifield and contrast as within-
subject factors. Hit-rates were transformed with the arcsine square root before statistical analysis. Discrimination performance was
significantly different between low contrast stimuli (mean = 0.50, Bca 95%CI = [0.48–0.51]) and high contrast stimuli
(mean = 0.74, Bca 95%CI = [0.69–0.77]) (significant main effect of contrast: F(1,12) = 134, p = 7.3·10−8 η2 = 0.8). The main
effect of stimulus hemifield and the contrast × hemifield interaction were not significant (p > .1).
3.2. Amplification of evoked activity differentiates between Null, Partial, and full conscious perception
We first estimated whether the evoked responses (ERs) were correlated with partial conscious perception and full conscious visual
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Fig. 2. ERs are strengthened with partial consciousness and object discrimination. (A) A fraction of the 200 brain areas (parcels) in which the evoked responses
(ERs) during Detection Hit trials were stronger compared to Detection Miss trials (T-test, p < .01, cluster corrected). Thick lines represent results obtained
with the full dataset while thin lines represent results obtained with leave-one-out jackknifing resampling. Time is displayed on the x-axis and the
proportion of parcels with significant positive (P+) response on the y-axis. (B) The cortical areas in which evoked activity was stronger for Detection Hit
trials compared to Detection Miss trials, displayed on an inflated three-dimensional cortical surface. Colors of the parcels indicate average strength of the
evoked activity over the 0.25–0.35 s and 0.35–0.45 s time windows. (C) A fraction of the parcels in which ERs were stronger for Correct Discrimination
compared to Incorrect Discrimination (T-test, p < .05, cluster corrected). (D) The cortical areas in which evoked activity was stronger for Discrimination
Correct trials compared to Discrimination Incorrect trials. Colors of the parcels indicate average strength of the evoked activity over the 0.4–0.6 s time
window. Parcels are indicated with acronyms: inferior frontal sulcus (iFS), frontal eye fields (FEF), insular gyrus (ING), superior temporal sulcus (sTS),
superior occipital gyrus (sOG), primary visual cortex (V1), middle occipital sulcus (mOS), intraparietal sulcus (intPS), superior temporal gyrus (sTG),
inferior parietal gyrus (iPG), inferior frontal gyrus (iFG), middle frontal gyrus (mFG), superior frontal sulcus (sFS), inferior temporal gyrus (iTG), middle
occipital gyrus (mOG), secondary visual cortex (V2), fusiform gyrus (fusG), superior occipital sulcus (sOS), middle temporal gyrus (mTG), middle frontal
sulcus (mFS), postcentral gyrus (poCG), superior frontal gyrus (sFG), and fronto-marginal gyrus (mrgF).
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perception. As visual processing is lateralized to the contralateral visual cortex during early processing stages, we estimated the
fraction of parcels that were significantly stronger (P+) for detected and undetected stimuli compared to baseline for the full dataset
(thick line) and for each jack-knifed sample (thin lines) separately for stimuli presented to the left and right hemifield, as well as
averaged over both stimuli (Fig. S1). ERs were clearly visible and very similar for all stimulus combinations. Also the fraction of
parcels that showed stronger activity for the detected than undetected stimuli were similar for stimuli presented to the left and right
hemifields and also did not show clear hemispheric lateralization (Fig. S2). The same pattern was observed for discriminated stimuli,
incorrectly discriminated stimuli, and their comparison (Figs. S1 and S2). These data suggest that extensive hemispheric connectivity
rapidly leads to bilateral processing of visual information. Due to the similarity of the behavioral and ER data, we combined trials for
stimuli presented in the left and right hemifields in all subsequent analysis.
We next computed the correlation of ERs with partial consciousness. Detection Hit > Detection Miss contrast (Fig. 2A) showed a
difference in the ERs from 0.2 s onwards, with the number of significant parcels increasing steadily, and peaking at 0.3 s and 0.4 s
with over 20% and 25% of brain regions displaying significantly increased activity (226 ± 90 trials for each subject, mean ± SD).
ERs were stronger for the detected than undetected stimuli in several parcels of the visual system as well as in several parcels of the
posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and lateral prefrontal cortices (lPFC) (Fig. 2B). In the visual system, ERs were stronger in the parcels
functionally part of V1/V2, as well as in the ventral visual stream regions such as superior occipital gyrus (sOG), and middle occipital
sulcus (mOS) in the occipital cortex. In the PPC, intraparietal sulcus (intPS) and in the lPFC, inferior frontal gurys (iFG), middle
frontal gyrus/sulcus (mFG/S) and superior precentral sulcus, corresponding functionally to frontal eye fields (FEF), also showed
increased evoked activity for Hits compared to Misses.
To assess the neural correlates of full consciousness and, specifically, the ability to discriminate two distinct visual stimuli, we
compared cortical responses between trials in which stimuli were correctly discriminated (Discrimination Correct) and those in which
they were not (Discrimination Incorrect) for high contrast trials (179 ± 60 trials for each subject) (Fig. 2C). Only few cortical areas
displayed significantly stronger activity in Discrimination Correct compared to Discrimination Incorrect trials, with the activity
peaking at 0.5 s and 0.8 s (Fig. 2D). Stronger evoked responses for the correctly discriminated trials were found in the middle
occipital sulcus (mOS) of the visual system, postcentral gyrus (poCG) of the PPC, and iFS of the lPFC.
3.3. Partial consciousness is associated with alpha and beta band amplitude modulations
We next investigated how oscillation amplitudes were modulated by partial and full conscious perception. All stimuli were
followed by a sustained increase in the theta/low-alpha- (3–10 Hz) band amplitudes and a concurrent wide-band amplitude sup-
pression between 10–50 Hz (Fig. 3A and B). These modulations were stronger for detected and undetected stimuli and hence cor-
related with partial consciousness (Fig. 3A). However, neither these modulations nor late onset amplitude increase in the beta band
(15–20 Hz) differentiated correctly discriminated from undiscriminated stimuli (the stimuli could be of two different shapes)
(Fig. 3B).
As the detected and undetected stimuli differed not only by conscious perception, but could also be confounded by a response
requirement and motor action that was demanded (Tsuchiya, Wilke, Frässle, & Lamme, 2015), we next confirmed that the differences
in neural responses were not related to motor processing. We divided the responses within each subject into ‘fast’ (0.785 ± 0.126 s,
mean ± SD across subjects) and ‘slow’ (1.116 ± 0.168 s) response categories by the individual median RT (0.907 ± 0.144 s across
subjects). We then estimated the strength of the evoked responses and oscillatory amplitudes separately for the two response cate-
gories, compared to when the stimuli was not detected (141 ± 54 trials for each subject) (Fig. 4). The Detection Miss trials used for
both comparisons were the same. For fast and slow responses, the evoked responses and oscillation amplitude dynamics did not differ
significantly. This indicates that both the increased evoked activity, and the alpha/beta oscillations were related to conscious per-
ception, and not the coordination of motor actions.
3.4. Neural correlates of full vs partial consciousness
The final aim of the study was to understand how cortical activity differed between full and partial consciousness. The difference
in partial and full conscious perception being a graded phenomenon posed a problem for identifying their neuronal correlates, as only
very few responses of the same physical strength were differentially rated either fully or partially perceived. To account for the effect
of contrast strengths between the fully and partially perceived stimuli, we next investigated changes in evoked activity and oscillation
amplitudes in only high contrast stimuli (179 ± 91 trials for each subject) (Fig. 5). In trials where participants rated the stimuli as
fully visible, compared to trials in which the stimuli were rated as partially visible, significant increases in evoked activity was
observed between 0.2 and 0.4 s, and between 0.6 and 0.8 s (Fig. 5A). Early increases in the ER was localized to fronto-parietal regions
such as the fronto-marginal gyrus (mrgF), inferior parietal gyrus (iPG), and middle-anterior cingulate (aCIm) (Fig. 5B) while during
the later time window ER was also observed in higher visual and inferior temporal regions, such as anterior occipital sulcus (aOS) and
middle temporal gyrus (mTG), in addition to superior and inferior frontal gyurs (s/iFG).
Oscillation amplitudes for high contrast stimuli between fully visible and partially visible stimuli showed modulations in narrow-
band theta activity (6–7 Hz) (Fig. 5C). Similar to the ER, the theta-band increases were observed late between 0.5 and 0.8 s from
stimulus onset. This increase was observed in occipital and temporal regions, such as primary visual cortex (V1) and occipito-
temporal gyrus (OTG) as well as parietal regions, such as the post-central and pre-central gyrus (Fig. 5D).
For comparative purposes, we also compared high-contrast, fully perceived stimuli with low-contrast, partially perceived stimuli
(317 ± 128 trials for each subject). Full consciousness was associated with a significantly stronger evoked response compared to
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partial consciousness, with a peak at around 0.2 s and a smaller peak at 0.4–0.6 s (Fig. 6A). Increased evoked activity for high contrast
stimuli was localized to early visual areas and the latter time-window also to lateral occipito-temporal sulcus (laOTS) and lPFC
(Fig. 6B). In addition, transient modulations of theta oscillation amplitudes as well as late onset increase in alpha and beta band
amplitudes were stronger for full compared to partial consciousness (Fig. 6C). Interestingly, induced beta-band amplitudes that were
exclusively found for full conscious perception were localized to the occipitotemporal visual areas including laOTS, medial occipi-
totemporal sulcus (meOTS) and iTS, as well as to PPC and lPFC (Fig. 6D). We cannot, however, exclude the possibility that these
effects were not due to differences in the contrast strengths rather than the difference between full and partial consciousness.
3.5. Oscillation amplitudes in the theta band and evoked activity are correlated with subjective visibility ratings
To reveal if subjective visibility would also be correlated with the strength of neuronal responses, we first estimated the individual
distributions of visibility ratings that were provided at the conclusion of each trial (Fig. 7A). For the low contrast condition, parti-
cipants rated stimuli as not visible (mean = 52.7%, bias-corrected and accelerated [Bca] 95%CI = [41.1–62.4]) and barely visible
(mean = 39.5%, Bca 95%CI = [29.1–41.4]) but not partially or fully visible. In contrast and as expected, for the high contrast
condition, participants mostly rated stimuli as fully (mean = 31.2%, Bca 95%CI = [21.8–42.5]) and partially visible
Fig. 3. Oscillation amplitudes are modulated by partial consciousness and object discrimination. (A) Partial consciousness was estimated as a difference in
the responses between Hit and Miss low-contrast stimuli. Time-frequency representation (TFR) of oscillation amplitude modulations for Low
contrast Detection Hit trials, Detection Miss trials, and for the difference between Hit and Miss trials. Red colors denote the fraction of cortical
parcels where the amplitude was greater (positive tail, P+) and blue colors where the amplitude was smaller (negative tail, P-) compared to the
prestimulus baseline or between stimulus conditions (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < 0.05, FDR corrected). Partial compared to null consciousness
was associated with sustained increase in theta-band amplitudes and concurrent wide-band amplitude suppression between 8 and 40 Hz (B) Same as
in A, but for object discrimination. TFRs show amplitude modulations for correct discrimination, incorrect discrimination, and difference between
correct and incorrect discrimination for high contrast stimuli. Oscillation amplitudes were not correlated with object discrimination. (For inter-
pretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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(mean = 51.1%, Bca 95%CI = [42.7–60.5]) with a minority of trials being rated as barely visible (mean = 16.1%, Bca
95%CI = [8.8–27.8]).
A Pearson randomization test (p < 0.01) was subsequently used to test whether subjective visibility, regardless of the contrast
strength, was correlated with the strength of ERs (Fig. 7B) and oscillation amplitudes (Fig. 7C) (159 ± 72 trials for each subject).
Both ERs and theta-band amplitudes showed sustained correlation with the visibility ratings across the visual system but also in PPC
and lPFC (Fig. 7D–E). To further investigate whether the correlation with visibility was due to differences in contrast strength or by
the actual visibility, we plotted the mean strengths of the significant regions for all of the subjective visibility ratings. We deduced
that if the correlation was due to contrast strengths, the distribution of the strengths should be bimodal and clearly separate low- and
high contrast stimuli (as in Fig. 7A) while if it was due to differences in visibility the correlation should be linear and not show a clear
distinction between low- and high contrast trials.
Both the ERs and theta band amplitudes increased as a function of visibility (Fig. 7F–G). Regression analysis was used to fit the
evoked responses and theta band amplitudes to the curve of best fit. The evoked responses were fit with a quadratic regression model,
indicating decreased differences between the ER of partially and fully visible stimuli. The theta-band amplitudes, however, displayed
a linear relationship, indicating that oscillation amplitudes were not fully dependent on contrast strengths but rather on the visibility
ratings from ‘Not visible’ to ‘Fully visible’. In contrast, the ERs were more reflecting changes in contrast strengths albeit with a small
component reflecting also changes in visibility.
Fig. 4. Correlation of post-stimulus dynamics with reaction times. A fraction of the brain areas in which evoked responses and oscillation amplitudes of
Detection Hit trials, were significantly different from Detection Miss trials separately for fast and slow RTs, (Evoked responses: T-test, p < .01,
cluster corrected; Oscillation amplitudes: Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < 0.05, FDR corrected). The trials were split at the median RT of each
subject and the mean of these median RTs was 0.907 ± 0.144 s (mean ± SD across subjects). Bottom row shows the fraction of brain areas in
which the evoked responses and oscillation amplitudes were significantly different between fast and slow trials of Detection Hit (Evoked responses:
T-test, p < .01, cluster corrected; Oscillation amplitudes: Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < 0.05, FDR corrected).
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Fig. 5. ERs and oscillation amplitudes for fully visible compared to partially visible high contrast trials. (A) A fraction of the brain areas (parcels) in which
ERs were significantly different when the stimuli was rated as fully visible compared to when the stimuli was rated as partially visible for high
contrast trials (T-test, p < .05, cluster corrected) as a function of time. Positive values (P+) indicate significant increases in evoked activity in fully
visible compared to partially visible trials, while negative values (P−) indicate significant decreases in evoked activity. (B) The cortical areas in
which evoked activity was stronger for Fully visible compared to Partially visible trials over the 0.2–0.4 s and 0.6–0.8 s time windows. Colors of the
parcels indicate average strength of the evoked activity over the time window. (C) TFRs of amplitude modulations that were significantly different
for Fully visible trials compared to Partially visible trials (Wilcoxon signed rank, p < .05, FDR corrected). (D) The cortical areas in which increased
amplitude in 6.5 Hz were observed in the 0.5–0.8 s time window. Parcels are indicated with acronyms: fronto-marginal gyrus (mrgF), anterior
cingulate (CIa), middle-anterior cingulate (aCIm), gyrus rectus (rcG), paracentral lobule (paC), and occipito-temporal gyrus (OTG), anterior occi-
pital sulcus (aOS), superior insula (sINS), superior parietal gyrus (sPG). Rest of acronyms as in Figs. 2 and 4.
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Fig. 6. ERs and oscillation amplitudes are strengthened in full compared to partial consciousness. (A) A fraction of the brain areas (parcels) in which ERs
were stronger for Discrimination Correct trials compared to Detection Hit trials (T-test, p < .01, cluster corrected) as a function of time. (B) The
cortical areas in which evoked activity was stronger for Discrimination Correct compared to Detection Hit over the 0.1–0.3 s and 0.4–0.6 s time
windows. (C) TFRs of amplitude modulations that were significantly different for Discrimination Correct trials compared to Detection Hit trials
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < .05, FDR corrected). (D) The cortical areas in which increased beta-band (13–26 Hz) amplitudes were observed in
the 0.6–0.8 s time window. Parcels are indicated with acronyms: inferior insula (iINS), lateral occipital temporal sulcus (laOTS), medial occipito-
temporal sulcus (meOTS), lateral sulcus (laSp), and inferior temporal sulcus (iTS). Rest of acronyms as in Figs. 2, 4, and 5.
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Fig. 7. ERs and oscillation amplitudes are correlated with participants’ visibility ratings. (A) Distribution of visibility ratings for each participant and
contrast condition. Participants rated Low contrast stimuli predominantly as Not Visible or Barely Visible. Conversely, they rated High contrast
stimuli predominantly as Partially Visible or Fully Visible. (B) A fraction of the brain areas (parcels) in which the strength of ER between Not Visible,
Barely Visible, Partially Visible, and Fully Visible conditions were significantly correlated (Pearson randomization test, p < .01, FDR corrected).
Dashed square indicates time period used in D to visualize significant parcels. (C) TFR of the correlation between oscillation amplitudes with the
participants’ visibility ratings (Pearson randomization test, p < .01, FDR corrected). The transient early theta amplitudes were correlated with the
visibility ratings. Dashed square indicates the time-frequency window used in E to visualize parcels in which significant correlations were observed.
(D) The cortical parcels in which significant positive correlation between ER and visibility ratings were observed between 0.2 and 0.4 s. (E) The
cortical parcels in which significant positive correlation between amplitude and visibility ratings were observed between 0.2 and 0.4 s and 3–8 Hz.
(F) Strength of the evoked response averaged over significant parcels in D for each visibility rating. Regression analysis was used to fit the trajectory
of evoked strength to a quadratic curve. (G) Same as F, but for theta-band amplitudes. The parcel amplitudes were fit with a linear regression model.
Parcels are indicated with acronyms: precentral sulcus (prCS), postcentral sulcus (poCS), central sulcus (CS). Rest of acronyms as in Figs. 2–6.
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4. Discussion
We used source-reconstructed MEG data to investigate differences in the evoked activity and oscillation amplitudes between fully
and partially perceived visual stimuli. Both partial and full conscious perception were associated with long-lasting evoked activity.
Critically, the cortical sources of both partial and full conscious perception were distributed throughout the brain from the visual
system to PPC and PFC, supporting the idea that conscious perception arises from “broadcasting” information across brain regions
(Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Sergent & Dehaene, 2004b; van Vugt et al., 2018). The cortical sources of full compared to partial visual
perception were, however, localized to the higher-order visual system.
4.1. Visual perception is a graded phenomenon
Our behavioral results indicate that visual perception is a graded process both at the objective and subjective level. The two
interleaved Bayesian staircases we used to determine individual thresholds (objective performance of 50% detection and 77% correct
discrimination) displayed very distinct performance profiles across all participants. Objective measures of awareness indicated that
subjects had greater sensitivity and lower response bias for high than low-contrast stimuli. Furthermore, when stimulus strength was
such that only 50% of stimuli were detected, stimulus identification was at chance-level. Participants were thus only partially aware
of stimuli at perceptual threshold: they were aware of a perceptual experience, but did not have a precise representation of its
content. Such chance level detection performance at perceptual threshold is in line with previous results using simple unmasked
stimuli (Koivisto et al., 2017; Tagliabue et al., 2016) and higher order masked stimuli (Magazzini, Ruhnau, & Weisz, 2016). When
stimulus strength was calibrated to achieve above-chance level identification, the perceptual experience becomes vivid enough that
nearly all stimuli were identified so that participants were fully aware of both the perceptual experience and its contents. Such
phenomena where stimuli are only sometimes detected if they are not identified and always detected when they are identified
indicates that the difference in partial and full conscious perception is a graded phenomenon (Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005; Sekar
et al., 2013; Sergent & Dehaene, 2004a). This dichotomy between partial and full consciousness was also present in subjective
measures of awareness. Participants rated seen low contrast stimuli almost exclusively as barely visible while they rated high contrast
stimuli mostly as partially or fully visible. In line with previous research (Andersen, Pedersen, Sandberg, & Overgaard, 2015;
Overgaard et al., 2006; Sandberg et al., 2011), perception of simple visual stimuli displayed a transition from the barely perceptible
experience of partial consciousness to the detailed experience of full consciousness. These results are similar to recent findings using
the multiple object tracking paradigm which found that participants can be aware of stimulus location but not of its identity (Wu &
Wolfe, 2018).
4.2. Partial consciousness is correlated with early widespread cortical activation
When participants were able to detect but not identify the visual stimuli, increased evoked activity dissociated seen and unseen
stimuli. Using spectral analysis of oscillation amplitudes, we further found sustained theta (3–7 Hz) band increase along with wide-
band amplitude suppression from 10 to 40 Hz to dissociate visual conscious perception from unseen visual stimuli. Evoked activity
differentiating seen and unseen stimuli peaked at 300 and 400 ms from stimulus onset, corresponding to N200 and P3 that are known
correlates of visual conscious perception in prior EEG (Del Cul et al., 2007; Koivisto et al., 2008; Rutiku, Aru, & Bachmann, 2016;
Eklund & Wiens, 2018) and MEG sensor-level data (Andersen et al., 2015; Sandberg et al., 2013; Sandberg, Barnes, Rees, &
Overgaard, 2014; Sekar et al., 2013).
While many studies have found gamma (30–120 Hz) amplitudes to be correlated with conscious perception in MEG sensor-level
(Palva, Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2005; Wyart & Tallon-Baudry, 2008) and iEEG (Aru et al., 2012; Fisch et al., 2009; Gaillard et al.,
2009; Vidal et al., 2014; Vidal et al., 2015) data, we found no evidence for the hypothesis that gamma amplitudes are correlated with
conscious perception per se, as indicated by partial consciousness. In contrast, we used MEG source reconstruction to identify cortical
regions underlying visual conscious perception and found evoked activity as well as sustained theta oscillations to be larger for the
consciously perceived than unperceived stimuli. This activity was observed both in primary and in ventral visual stream regions
higher in the cortical processing hierarchy, as well as intPS of PPC and in lPFC. These findings are well in agreement with those from
iEEG (Gaillard et al., 2009; Noy et al., 2015) and for somatosensory perception (Hirvonen & Palva, 2016) but differ from a prior study
that used MEG source-reconstruction and found only occipital sources (Andersen et al., 2015).
Our data supports the model of conscious perception where frontal cortex plays a key role in supporting the emergence of
conscious percepts (Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, & Slachevsky,
2009; Gaillard et al., 2009). The widespread and early increase of evoked activity and oscillation amplitudes supports the neural
‘ignition’ model where large-scale reverberating activity characterizes the transition from null to partial consciousness and marks the
shift between the lack of any conscious percept to a perceptual experience, however faint the awareness may be (Dehaene &
Changeux, 2011; van Vugt et al., 2018).
4.3. Neural correlates of full consciousness
We also compared neuronal activity between full and partial consciousness between different contrast strengths as had been done
in some previous studies (King, Pescetelli, & Dehaene, 2016; Tagliabue et al., 2016) and found beta-oscillations (13–26 Hz) and
evoked activity to be stronger for the high-contrast fully perceived than for the low-contrast partially perceived stimuli. This is in line
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with prior studies that have found the amplitude modulations of beta and gamma oscillations to be correlated with conscious sensory
perception in sensor-level MEG (Schurger, Cowey, & Tallon-Baudry, 2006; Wyart & Tallon-Baudry, 2008), and iEEG (Aru et al., 2012;
Fisch et al., 2009; Gaillard et al., 2009; Lachaux et al., 2005; Vidal et al., 2015; Herman et al., 2019) data. Beta oscillations were
found in lateral occipito-temporal areas that underlie object recognition (Bar et al., 2001; Cichy, Chen, & Haynes, 2011; Grill-Spector,
Kushnir, Hendler, & Malach, 2000; Orlov & Zohary, 2018), suggesting that they could be related to the representation of stimulus
features and stimulus information as found previously (Grutzner et al., 2013; Honkanen et al., 2015; Palva, Linkenkaer-Hansen et al.,
2005; Singer, 1999; Tallon-Baudry, Bertrand, Peronnet, & Pernier, 1998). The activation of frontoparietal regions in both evoked
activity and in theta and beta oscillations was similar to that observed to characterize full conscious perception in several prior
studies involving fMRI (Blankenburg et al., 2003; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Hegner, Lindner, & Braun, 2016; Li Hegner, Lindner, &
Braun, 2015), iEEG (Fisch et al., 2009; Gaillard et al., 2009) and source-reconstructed MEG data (Hirvonen & Palva, 2016; King et al.,
2016; Salti et al., 2015). The preceding studies have shown that local neuronal activity in frontoparietal regions, together with that in
sensory areas, is positively correlated with conscious perception. However, it cannot be excluded that the beta oscillations in our
study reflect only increases in the contrasts strengths and further studies are needed to resolve this issue.
Correct identification compared to incorrect identification of stimulus identity for high contrast visual stimuli was associated only with
an increase in evoked activity between 400 and 600 ms from stimulus onset in middle occipital sulcus (mOS) of the visual system, as well
as in post-central gyrus (poCG) and iFS. The weak differences between correctly and incorrectly identified visual stimuli are not surprising
taken that this difference is primarily due to differences in visual perception rather than differences in conscious perception per se. This
view is supported by the localization of the difference between correct and incorrect identification to mOS and iFS, as they have been
shown to be sensitive to stimulus features (Kravitz et al., 2013; Munk et al., 2002) and may hence here be related to the processing of
stimulus identity in conscious perception. Interestingly, iFS and poCG are also key hubs in the attention networks (Corbetta & Shulman,
2002), which suggests a contribution of attentional top-down modulation to object identification.
4.4. Evoked activity and theta oscillations dissociate full from partial consciousness
The problem for identifying neuronal correlates of partial and full visual conscious perception was that few responses of the same
physical strength were differentially rated either full or partially perceived. In full consciousness, participants were able to both
consciously perceive and correctly identify a stimuli, while in partial consciousness, participants perceived a stimuli but were not able
to report its identity. We hence compared neuronal activity for high contrast stimuli that were either fully or partially perceived. Here
both early and late evoked activity and late theta-band oscillations were stronger for the fully than partially perceived stimuli. This is
in agreement with prior data that have found enhanced theta oscillations for conscious somatosensory awareness (Hirvonen, Monto,
Wang, Palva, & Palva, 2018; Hirvonen & Palva, 2016) and to be correlated with subjective reports of words reported as perceived
(Melloni et al., 2007). The late response is in line with prior studies involving stimulus identification that have observed late cor-
relates of full consciousness (Del Cul et al., 2007; Gaillard et al., 2009; Levy, Vidal, Fries, Démonet, & Goldstein, 2015; Wyart &
Tallon-Baudry, 2008). Conversely, these results imply that during early visual processing, stimulus is only coarsely experienced and
finer representations of the sensory properties of the object occur only at later time points (Koivisto et al., 2017; Mack, Gauthier, Sadr,
& Palmeri, 2008). These data together suggest that the key components dissociating full and partial visual conscious perception,
independently of visual contrast, are the late evoked activity between 400 and 600 ms after stimulus onset together with enhanced
theta-band oscillations.
Cortical regions in which neuronal activity dissociated full from partial conscious perception were V1 and anterior occipital sulcus
in the visual system as well as iPG, PoCG/S, iFGm, and sFG that belong to fronto-parietal attention networks frequently associated
with conscious perception (Dehaene et al., 2003; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Del Cul et al., 2009; Gaillard et al., 2009). Interestingly,
the anterior cingulate and insula also showed increased evoked activity to fully compared to partially perceived visual stimuli.
Anterior cingulate has been linked to perceptual consciousness in prior fMRI and single neuron recordings indicating the key role of
this region in signaling the content of conscious perception (Chica, Bayle, Botta, Bartolomeo, & Paz-Alonso, 2016; Gelbard-Sagiv,
Mudrik, Hill, Koch, & Fried, 2018). Moreover, both anterior cingulate and insula have been associated with mind-body associations
(Popa et al., 2019) and with self-awareness (Park et al., 2018) suggesting, together with our data, that the activity of these regions is
related to the richness of perceptual experiences.
Evoked activity and sustained theta amplitudes were also correlated with participants’ visibility reports. As the strength of theta-
band amplitudes increased linearly with visibility, this increase in the strength cannot be explained by differences in contrast
strengths. However, the increase in ERs reflected changes in contrast strengths but also in visibility, as found in prior sensor-level EEG
(Tagliabue et al., 2016) and MEG (Andersen et al., 2015) studies where the strength of ERs were correlated with ratings in the
perceptual awareness scale (PAS). Since ERs were correlated with contrast strength and slightly with subjective visibility scores, ERs
likely reflect the intensity of stimulus representations rather than the coding of object identity per se. Similar to prior fMRI studies that
have found BOLD activity in distributed brain regions being correlated with graded visual perception (Binder et al., 2017; Christensen
et al., 2006; Imamoglu et al., 2014), our results showed that correlation of visibility with theta oscillations is found in a distributed
network across the visual system, PPC, and PFC, and of which activity may reflect the intensity of the conscious experience.
4.5. Evoked activity and theta oscillations as part of NCC
We found that both evoked activity and sustained theta/low-alpha oscillations could be part of the NCC. In addition to the NCC,
post-stimulus activity following conscious perception can also be confounded by a response requirement (Tsuchiya et al., 2015) and
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the consequences following consciousness (NCC-co) (Aru, Bachmann, Singer, & Melloni, 2012; Pitts, Martinez, & Hillyard, 2012;
Tsuchiya et al., 2015). However, the independence of the ERs or oscillation amplitudes on response RTs and the similarity of these
post-perceptual processing for the fast and slow response trials suggest that theta/low alpha-band amplitudes and ERs are part of the
NCC for conscious visual perception. Further evidence for ERs and theta/low-alpha band oscillations was gained from the comparison
between full and partial conscious perception for high contrast stimuli (Fig. 5) as well as between the contrast strengths (Fig. 6) that
were associated with identical response requirements and post-perceptual processing but yet revealed very similar patterns of evoked
and oscillatory activity as a correlate of conscious perception. These results are in line with prior EEG studies that have shown that
early (Koivisto, Salminen‐Vaparanta, Grassini, & Revonsuo, 2016; Ye & Lyu, 2019) and late (Eklund, Gerdfeldter, & Wiens, 2019)
neural correlates of conscious perception are not related to response requirement.
5. Conclusions
We used MEG to reveal neuronal correlates of partial and full visual conscious perception and their differences. NCC for partial
consciousness included increased early evoked activity, sustained increase in theta/low-alpha band amplitudes, and a wideband
suppression of oscillation amplitudes. NCC for full conscious perception was additionally associated with a late increase in both beta
band amplitudes and late evoked activity. Yet, NCC for full compared to partial conscious perception differed only by the stronger
evoked activity and theta oscillations for full conscious perception. These data are in line with the view that the neuronal contents of
conscious sensory perception (characterized by full consciousness) are distinct from awareness itself (partial consciousness) (Aru
et al., 2012; Pitts, Padwal, Fennelly, Martinez, & Hillyard, 2014; Vidal et al., 2015), as well as with the partial awareness hypothesis
which posits that the levels of awareness depend on which representational levels can be accessed (Kouider et al., 2010).
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